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Abstract
We investigate communication and costly voting in multiparty election experiments.
Turnout is consistently lower in across electorate communication as compared to restricted
communication within parties. Voters are more likely to choose the strategic voting option
at the outset in restricted communication, but more likely to start deliberation by stating
their first preference when unrestricted. Distributions of earnings are more inequitable
when communication is restricted and the candidate preferred by the minority of voters is
more likely to win. We also find that even restricted communication significantly increases
participation and strategic voting by swing voters, above and beyond induced identity effects.
1 Introduction
In almost all voting situations individuals engage in communication prior to voting. They
discuss, for example, their preferences over the choices before them, how they might choose, or
∗Support for this research by the Ministry for Science and Culture of Lower Saxony (VW-Vorab) is gratefully
acknowledged. We also thank the Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg (HWK) for Rebecca Morton’s fellowship stay in
Germany during the work on this project. We appreciate comments from Oliver Pamp, Frans Van Winden, and
participants at the Experimental Political Science Conference at the HWK in December 2008, the 2008 CESifo
Venice Summer Institute on Behavioral Public Economics, and the 2009 ECPR Panel on experiments in Potsdam.
In particular, we thank Thomas Kalwitzki for important ideas and comments on the analysis of chat transcripts,
and Woo Chang Kang, Jorge Gallego, and Birgit Peuker for research assistance.
†Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna
‡Corresponding author:Institute for Macroeconomics, Faculty of Economics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Uni-
versitaetsstrasse 150, 4801 Bochum, wolfgang.luhan@rub.de.
§Department of Politics, New York University
1
the costs they face from participating. Some structured communication exists in large elections
such as in polls, but almost always there is also unstructured communication where individuals
are free to speak or not and to determine what they will say. Rarely do people cast a ballot
without such prior free-form discussion with at least some of the other participants. This
circumstance is all the more relevant as the constituency becomes smaller, such as elections or
decisions in parties and associations, or club and faculty meetings.
Studies of communication in voting have yielded interesting insights—we know that com-
munication can increase turnout in costly voting elections (Großer and Schram, 2006) and that
communication can increase the ability of voters to coordinate and vote strategically in elec-
tions with multiple (more than two) choices (Rietz, 1993). However, it is seldom the case that
communication is either impossible or completely unrestricted. In natural settings, individuals
are structured into subgroups such as parties, factions or friends. It follows that deliberative
contributions from different sources have different impacts on individual voting decisions.
Currently, we have little knowledge of how free-form communication proceeds and of the
effects of different types of communication networks on how voters choose. We therefore in-
troduce communication barriers between groups and study the effect of such restrictions. In
particular, how much does it matter if voters can only communicate with a subset of voters
(such as other party members) rather than with a larger set of voters? Are voters less likely
to turnout if communication is restricted to a subset of fellow participants? Is communication
across groups of voters necessary for coordination of voters in elections with more than two
choices? Or is the mere existence of some communication, even if restricted within a group,
important enough to affect turnout and coordination?
A growing number of studies have examined the effects of communication in voting. How-
ever, previous research has focused on three mutually exclusive situations: (1) situations where
voting is costless, abstention is not allowed, choices are binary, and communication is free-form
across all voters (e.g. Goeree and Yariv, 2011), (2) situations where voting is costly, abstention
is allowed, choices are binary, and structured communication about turnout decisions occurs
between subsets of individuals (e.g. Großer and Schram, 2006), and (3) situations where voting
is not costly, abstention is allowed, choices are multiple (greater than two), and structured com-
munication to all voters occurs via polls and campaign advertisements (Rietz, 1993).1 Because
1Free-form communication in elections was allowed in early voting experiments (see Fiorina and Plott, 1978),
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the variation in voting costs, abstention possibilities, vote options, and communication possi-
bilities, it is not possible to draw inferences from comparisons of studies of voting behaviour
with limited communication networks (as in Großer and Schram, 2006) to those with broad
communication networks (as in Goeree and Yariv, 2011; Rietz, 1993).
Furthermore, participation costs, multiple choices, and pre-voting communication charac-
terize a large number of collective choice processes but none of the above-mentioned studies
combine all three characteristics. From a technical point of view there are good reasons for (a)
separating the issues of multiple choices and costly voting in the theoretical and experimental
literature and (b) the lack of an elaborate examination of free-form communication in either
context. Simpler models and more controlled environments provide more easily testable propo-
sitions that can be studied in the laboratory or the field. Studying free-form communication
was technically infeasible or excessively tedious until recently.
Separating out the two characteristics of costly voting and multiple choices and ignoring
how pre-voting communication operates in such combined contexts leaves important avenues
unexplored. The desire to coordinate in multicandidate or multiparty elections may affect
voter abstention decisions. Mechanisms that increase coordination may also increase ethical
expressive voting if such mechanisms instil feelings of group or social solidarity. Großer and
Schram (2006) show that voters are influenced by the knowledge of other voters’ decisions to
turn out and are more likely to vote when voters with similar preferences have also voted. If
voters are more likely to participate if they value group welfare or the social aspect of voting
as a group, then coordinating in multichoice elections may enhance the group or ethical driven
utility they receive from participation.
In particular, the cognitive demands of elections with costly voting and multiple choices
may reduce turnout and the ability to coordinate on common candidates. That is, not only
will voters have to coordinate over strategic and sincere voting, but they will also need to
estimate the probabilities that voters in their group of diverse preferences will participate in the
election. Given the increased cognitive difficulties of such elections, it is unclear whether limited
communication networks can overcome these problems or if broader communication networks
are necessary.
but the possibilities to document the communication were much more restricted than in modern computer-based
chats.
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In this paper we compare the effects of variations in communication networks on turnout
and coordination in a voting game which combines costly voting with multiple choices. We
proceed in two steps. In the first step, we study the impact of communication by comparing
two non-communication treatments to two communication treatments. In the second step, we
focus on two types of free-form communication that differ by the extension of the communication
network. We define two parties and allow for communication only within parties in the one and
across both parties in the other treatment.
We use laboratory experiments as this method allows us to gather complete data on free-
form pre-voting communication. Hence we draw on and extend earlier experimental work on the
effect of communication (Brosig et al., 2003; Bosman et al., 2006; Luhan et al., 2009). We use
the communication protocols to study initial intentions and changes in these intentions in the
course of the communication process, which can then be compared to actual voting behaviour.
Our approach also enables us to compare elections with and without communication controlling
for preferences and choices.
In our discussion of the results, we first explore the effects of variations in communication
networks by statistically comparing the effects of variations in communication networks on elec-
tion outcomes and net payoffs. We then study voting behaviour in the different treatments and
compare stated voting intentions in the communication treatments with actual voting behaviour
in more detail. Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold: Firstly, in our theoretical
model as well as in the lab experiments, we combine multichoice elections with costly voting and
the possibility of abstention. To the best of our knowledge, this situation has not been examined
before. Secondly, we examine the effects of free form communication and group membership on
strategic voting and voter turnout.
In the next two sections we present our experimental design and situate our study in the
wider context of the literature. In section 4 we present our experimental results and section 5
discusses the implications of our findings for the study of voting.
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2 Multiparty Voting and Communication
2.1 Voting
In their seminal paper, Myerson and Weber (1993) describe a model of strategic voting in
multiparty elections with three parties A (30 percent), B (30 percent), and C (40 percent) with
utility vectors uA = (10, 9, 0) for voters of type A, uB = (9, 10, 0) for voters of type B, and
uC = (0, 0, 10) for voters of type C. They show that in this situation, there are three equilibria,
one in which all voters of type A and B vote for party A, and party A wins, one in which all
voters of type A and B vote for party B, and party B wins, and one in which all voters vote
for their first preference, and party C wins. We extend this approach by introducing a cost for
voting and thus an incentive to abstain (Levine and Palfrey, 2007).
We thus investigate multichoice elections where sets of subjects disagree over the preferred
party but share one least preferred party. In our setting there exist coordination equilibria in
which the least preferred party is defeated. We assign subjects to one of four preference types
labelled E, F , G, and H, presented in Table 1. These types define the subjects’ preferences
over the three parties (or candidates, policies) A,B and C in the election that are induced by
payoffs.2 We label voters of type E and H partisans as their payoffs are highest if Party A
(respectively, B) is elected but the payoffs from the election of B (respectively, A) are equivalent
to their payoffs from the election of C. Put differently, partisans have a first preferred party and
are indifferent between the remaining parties. Voters of type F and G have a clear preference
order. We call these subjects swing voters as their preference structure may induce them to
vote strategically: should their first preferred party be unlikely to win the election, it might be
rational to vote for their second preference in order to avoid a win by their least preferred party.
To allow for learning we implemented repeated votes. As Fudenberg (2006, 700) remarks:
“Game theorists have long understood that equilibrium analysis is unlikely to be a good predic-
tor of the outcome the first time people play an unfamiliar game ...” Many game theorists think
of equilibrium choices as the norms of play that have developed as an outcome of repetition
with randomization, learning from similar games, information gained from social learning, and
other sources. In order to avoid supergame effects, we varied the size of the electorate, the
2The payoffs were given in experimental points which were converted into Euros at a commonly known fixed
conversion rate at the end of the experiment.
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Table 1: Subject Payoffs
Winning Party
Voter Type A B C
E 155 75 75
F 155 105 55
G 105 155 55
H 75 155 75
distribution of voter types and the number of computer votes across periods so that subjects
perceived each voting game as a separate choice situation.3
In each period, the N subjects in a session were randomly divided into separate electorates
of differing sizes. The largest electorates contained all N subjects in one single election, the
smallest contained N/4 (see Appendix B). In every period the number of simultaneous yet
separate elections ranged from 1 to 4. Within each electorate, subjects were randomly assigned
to our four voter types according to predetermined distributions. Denote Ni as the number of
voters who are of type i and denote N j as the number of voters whose first preference is party
j. Therefore NA = NE +NF and N
B = NG +HH . In our variations across election periods, we
considered two types of cases:
1. Equal Support where NA = NB
2. Unequal Support where NA > NB or NA < NB.
The winner of the election is determined by simple majority rule. In case of a tie, a random
draw selects the winner from the coequal parties. In addition to the human subjects there are
also M computer voters who always participate and always vote for party C, which is common
knowledge. Hereafter when we refer to voters we refer to human subjects, not to the votes cast
by the computer. We varied the size of M from 0 to 1 +N j where party j is the party with the
larger number of supporters in case 2 above or either party in case 1 above. In Appendix B we
present the distributions of voter types used in a session with 22 subjects.4
3In a first trial we used a simpler design with fixed numbers of voters in each group, similar to that used
by Forsythe et al. (1993) in which subjects participated in a series of elections in which in each election period
subjects were randomly assigned to groups and then types within groups. This design produced supergame effects
(Morton and Williams, 2010, 164).
4As an anonymous referee has—rightfully—pointed out, the analysis of variations in N j and M is interesting
in itself. However, given the focus of our study we use these variations as controls in our factorial design.
6
IfM = 0, then obviously there is no incentive for voters of types F andG to vote strategically
for their second choice and all voters are essentially partisans. As M increases the incentives
for strategic voting increase. Given our model, three possible quasi-symmetric equilibria exist
when M > 0: (i) If voters participate, all voters vote sincerely. (ii) If voters participate, voters
of types E, F , and H vote sincerely and voters of type G vote strategically. (iii) If voters
participate, voters of types E, G, and H vote sincerely and voters of type F vote strategically.
In each of these equilibria, voters choose whether or not to participate based on their realized
cost of voting and their expectations of others’ choices.
As stated, voting was costly and abstention was possible. We adopt the voting cost distri-
bution from Levine and Palfrey (2007) where each voter pays a cost of participating equal to
c which is independently randomly drawn from [0, 55] previous to the voting decision.5 This
distribution was common knowledge but the individual voting costs were private information.
In multiparty contests such as the ones we examine, exact calculations of the pivot probabil-
ities for the critical cost values is not possible due to the non-linearities in the equation system
when endogenizing voter perceptions assuming rational and strategic calculations of the cross-
effects of all voter choices on their own choices and probabilities (see Appendix A for details).
One alternative is to assume that the number of voters is a random variable as in the Poisson
voting games of Myerson (1998). However, such an assumption is not realistic for the subjects
in our experiment given that the number of voters is finite and known.
Instead we follow the approach of Myerson and Weber (1993) which is also used in other
experiments on voting in multiparty situations (e.g. Forsythe et al., 1993; Forsythe and Rietz,
1996; Gerber et al., 1998; Morton and Rietz, 2008; Morton and Williams, 1999). That is,
we assume that voters form subjective expectations about the pivot probabilities and perceive
these probabilities as positive (even if they are perceived as small). Furthermore, we assume
the following:
1. Near-ties are perceived to be much more likely between two candidates than between three
candidates.6
5In the experiment only integer values were allowed. In Levine and Palfrey (2007), in contrast to our experi-
ment, subjects did not pay a cost to vote but received a bonus when they chose to abstain. In line with prospect
theory (Mercer, 2005) we contend that framing voting costs as a loss is more in line with the decision problem
involved in voting.
6In fact in our experiment we observed only one three-way tie out of 263 elections.
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2. The probability that a particular ballot moves one candidate past another for the last seat
is perceived to be proportional to the difference in votes cast on the ballot for the two
candidates.
3. Voters seek to maximize their expected utility gain from the outcome of the election.
Given these three assumptions, three possible quasi-symmetric equilibria exist for the cases
we examine in the experiments when M > 0: One in which, if voters participate, all voters vote
sincerely, one in which, if voters participate, voters of types E, F , and H vote sincerely and
voters of type G vote strategically, and one in which, if voters participate, voters of types E, G,
and H vote sincerely and voters of type F vote strategically. In each of these equilibria, voters
choose whether or not to participate based on their realized cost of voting as described above.
The crucial complication thus is that voters are uninformed about the other voters’ probability
to participate.
Differing from most previous experiments on multichoice elections (see, e.g. Forsythe et al.,
1993) we combine partisans and swing voters. Although partisans have no incentive to vote for
a second preference since voting is costly, we must take this possibility into account. Should we
observe such behaviour, we will consider this as ethical voting (Feddersen et al., 2009).
2.2 Communication
The ability of voters to decide whether to participate in an election and whether to vote sincerely
or strategically is greatly enhanced by information about other voters’ intentions and behaviour.
According to conventional wisdom in rational choice theory, statements that can neither be
verified nor result in binding commitments, such as intentions to vote before a secret ballot,
should be regarded as mere cheap talk (Croson et al., 2003; Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006;
Landa and Meirowitz, 2009), and thus be inconsequential for voting behaviour and outcomes.
This expectation, however, is neither supported by more recent theoretical contributions
nor by experimental findings. In an early experiment, Forsythe et al. (1993) have shown that
coordination among voters is facilitated by information provided by polls and previous elections.
Under highly structured conditions of information exchange among voters and strong restric-
tions on the kind of information provided, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) have studied the
conditions under which voters are induced to share information prior to voting. Unrestricted
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communication turns out to invalidate structure-induced voting equilibria and to equalize the
outcomes under a wide range of voting rules (Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). This result is corrobo-
rated by experimental findings. According to Goeree and Yariv (2011, 919-920), “[t]he results
illustrate the potential effects of communication on collective outcomes, but offer little guid-
ance on the precise product of the collective process. Our experimental results suggest stronger
impacts of communication: the selected outcomes are the same across institutions.”
Hence, formal voting theory currently offers little guidance as soon as communication among
voters is allowed. Following Bardsley et al. (2010, Ch. 4), we thus take a more inductive
perspective and try to establish some regularities that might help push forward formal reasoning
in the future (Roth, 1995, 22).
Subjects learn about other voters’ intentions by interpreting their statements such that
they can coordinate on a joint strategy. This view of subjects’ use of communication does not
necessarily imply that the communicative phase prior to voting can be viewed as deliberation
in the sense of “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions
in which subjects are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and
claims made by other subjects”(Chambers, 2003, 309). In the deliberative process, there is the
potential of strategic interaction as “participants aim to promote the beliefs and arguments they
consider compelling because they would like to affect the positions of other decision makers”
(Landa and Meirowitz, 2009, 434).
Besides this strategic content, communication can also have a cognitive dimension (Dickson
et al., 2008). A subject may misinterpret the situation, especially if information is imperfect
or asymmetric, and communication prior to a decision helps subjects to learn about consider-
ations relevant to their choice. In this dimension, a communicative act can be considered as
a contribution to a deliberative process in which subjects exchange ideas about the best way
to collectively handle a situation (Thompson, 2008; Mutz, 2008). Communication thus should
improve the coordination potential in a constituency because it helps subjects learn about the
collectively best solution to a problem.
Hence, the way in which a subject deals with information gained through communication
from other subjects depends on her assessment of the others’ trustworthiness. Given that it is
often the case that a rational strategy without communication is to abstain, it is by building
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up mutual trust during the communication phase that the volunteer’s dilemma entailed in the
voting decision may be overcome (Ostrom and Walker, 2003). Honest statements may not
be believed and deception may succeed. Communication may thus be used to update beliefs
about other subjects’ interaction orientations (Scharpf, 1997, 84–89). Thus the development of
mutual trust in the other subjects’ decisions to opt for the cooperative solution by not abstaining
crucially depends on each other’s assessment based on the communication phase: “What is truly
incompatible with consensus-oriented discussion is competitive interaction orientations, which
[...] will transform any interaction into a zero-sum conflict in which common interests have no
chance of being realized”(Scharpf, 1997, 165, emphasis in original).
If communication is allowed, the challenge for participants is one of coordination by deliber-
ation, under the threat of a victory by party C as the default outcome. With Thompson (2008)
we contend that the success or failure of a deliberative process, which is critically dependent
on this mutual assessment of trustworthiness, depends on the deliberative setting. We focus on
two settings—deliberation within a party and deliberation across parties. The former, in which
all voters’ statements are only received by members of the party to which a voter belongs, is a
setting of a general joint interest with heterogeneous but not diametrically opposed preference
orders and uncertainty about the other party members’ actions. It should induce cooperative
interaction orientations. The latter, in which all voters’ statements are received by the whole
electorate, is a setting of two camps with conflicting preference orders that need to coordinate
on joint action. Hence it should evoke competitive interaction orientations.
Deliberation within a party is characterized by two facets. First, although there may be a
dissenting faction, subjects can assume that for a majority of this party’s (say, A) members the
first preference is to vote for precisely this party. Voting for one’s own party is thus a focal
point. Second, however, the party members can also assume that the other party’s (say, B)
members follow exactly the same reasoning. This point is where the dissenting factions in the
parties may become pivotal players, because their votes may be the crucial votes needed for a
victory of either party. Within a party, the subjects have to collectively solve the problem of
gathering a sufficient number of votes for their jointly preferred outcome under the condition
of ignorance about the other party members’ reasonings. The deliberative process will thus be
geared toward a problem-solving mode.
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In deliberation across parties, the incentives described in Table 1 are such that the parties are
pitched against each other. Since all communication is public, the preference orders of party A
and party B members serve as a clearly visible divide that defines competitive orientations which
inhibit an “effective commitment to common problem solving” (Scharpf, 1997, 166, emphasis
in original).
2.3 Treatments
We implemented four treatments, Baseline, Party Label, Party Chat, and All Chat. While the
treatments all share the previously described features, the differences are as follows:
1. Baseline Treatment : Voters are informed about their voter types, their voting costs, the
number of voters in the election, the distribution of voter types, and the number of
computer voters M .
2. Party Label Treatment : In addition to the voter types, subjects are assigned a party
affiliation. Partisans are always assigned to their preferred party (E to A and H to B),
but swing voters are divided, with some assigned to party A and some assigned to party
B. The exact distributions of party assignments are provided in Table B1 (Appendix
B). The information provided to the subjects is the same as in the baseline treatment,
amended by their own party affiliation. The affiliations are pure labels with no effects on
voting or the payoffs. These assignments are common knowledge.
3. Party Chat Treatment : All settings from Baseline and Party Label prevail, additionally
voters were allowed to communicate with the other members of the same party via free-
form chat before voting.
4. All Chat Treatment : Identical to Party Chat, but now voters could communicate with the
whole electorate.
In a setting with costly voting and multiparty elections, these treatments enable us to
successively test a number of hypotheses. We now formulate these considerations in the form of
predictions for turnout, strategic voting, and deliberation strategies for the comparisons between
the four treatments.
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2.4 Hypotheses
Examining the Party Label treatment, we expect the labels to instil party identities, thereby
fostering coordination amongst voters. Evidence from the minimal group literature in social
psychology shows that subjects are often influenced by such assigned identities (Tajfel et al.,
1971; Kerr and Tindale, 2004).7 Giving voters an artificial party- or group-identity should
facilitate willingness to participate, regardless of whether they are partisans or swing voters.
We expect furthermore that swing voters assigned to their second-preferred party are more
likely to vote strategically than swing voters assigned to their first-preferred party.
Prediction 1 (Party Label Effects) Voter turnout will be higher in the Party Label than
in the Baseline treatment. Swing voters in the Party Label treatment assigned to their second-
preferred party will vote strategically more often than those assigned to their first-preferred party.
We now consider the effect of communication. Although coordination cannot be based on
binding agreements, the probability of beating party C can be gauged with more precision:
“(C)ommunication appears to play an important reassurance role, allowing subjects to coor-
dinate on more efficient equilibria by reducing their uncertainty about each other’s decisions”
(Crawford, 1998, 294). Errors in assessment can be addressed during the deliberative process
and potential strategic voters can be persuaded and mobilized.
Prediction 2 (Effects of Communication on Turnout) We expect to find higher turnout
in the Party Chat and in the All Chat treatments than in the Party Label and in the Baseline
treatments. Concomitantly, Party C will win less elections in the Party Chat and in the All
Chat treatments than in the Party Label and in the Baseline treatments.
Prediction 3 (Effects of Communication on Strategic Voting) We expect to find more
instances of strategic voting in the Party Chat and in the All Chat treatments than in the Party
Label and in the Baseline treatments.
Prediction 4 (Effects of Communication on Outcomes) In consequence of the effect of
communication on individual behaviour, Party C will win less elections in the Party Chat and
7Bassi et al. (2011) find evidence that voters may be influenced by such identities, particularly if they perceive
that their payoffs are unaffected by their choices, i.e. when voting expressively.
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in the All Chat treatments than in the Party Label and in the Baseline treatments. This results
in generally larger payoffs of individual subjects.
Finally, the only difference between the chat treatments are the communication restrictions.
While in the Party Chat treatment, communication is carried out in two separate groups, the
whole electorate is consolidated in one communication network in the All Chat treatment.
Restrictions on communication could have three effects in our experiments:8
First, communication within parties will affect turnout. However, the overall impact is con-
flicted because of two counteracting effects. On the one hand, partisan voters and swing voters
assigned to their first preferred parties may be more likely to participate when communication is
restricted within these parties than when it is unrestricted because of the higher degrees of group
identity. However, such identity effects cannot be expected from swing voters assigned to their
second preferred party. On the other hand, in the unrestricted chat voters obtain information
about the whole electorate, thereby reducing uncertainty about the expected voting behaviour
of others. For partisans and swing voters assigned to their first preferred party, social pressure
will increase because the effect of free-riding is more clearly observable. Reduced uncertainty
about others’ intentions will motivate swing voters assigned to their second preferred party to
cast their votes in order to either contribute to the victory of their first-preferred party or to
avoid a victory of party C, which would be their worst outcome.
Prediction 5 (Effects of Restricted Communication on Turnout) According to the group
identity effect, turnout of partisans and swing voters assigned to their first-preferred party will
be higher in the Party Chat than in the All Chat treatment. Turnout of swing voters assigned
to their second-preferred party will be higher when communication is unrestricted because of the
uncertainty-reducing effect.
Second, communication within parties might lead swing voters who are assigned to their
second-preferred party to be more likely to vote strategically. This effect might be fostered
by persuasive arguments in the group and the missing information concerning the fraction of
the electorate that constitutes the other party. We therefore expect to observe higher rates of
8We use the terms “restricted” and “unrestricted” communication in relation to the number of other agents
that a communication can reach, hence within-party communication is restricted, and communication with the
whole electorate is unrestricted. This usage is different from restrictions in the informative content of communi-
cation that we address by comparing treatments with communication to no-communication treatments.
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strategic voting from this group of swing voters than in theParty Label treatment. In the All
Chat treatment potential swing voters are exposed to the arguments of partisans from both
parties and the effect of group identity is undermined by the communication across groups.
Prediction 6 (Effects of Restricted Communication on Strategic Voting) Swing Vot-
ers in the Party Chat treatment assigned to their second-preferred party vote strategically more
often than those assigned to their first-preferred party and all swing voters in the All Chat
treatment or in treatments without communication.
Third, unrestricted communication may affect the choices of partisan voters. Specifically,
if communication across parties increases ethical voting, we expect to find that partisan voters
are more likely to vote ethically than when communication is restricted. A larger number of
chat participants might affect the choices over several channels: Obviously peer pressure may
increase; a larger number of arguments might be forwarded; and the social distance to the “other
party” is reduced despite the more confrontative setting of deliberation in the unrestricted com-
munication condition. When we understand ethical voting as driven by responsibility concerns,
this effect is definitely reinforced as individuals may feel responsible for a growing number of
group members.
Prediction 7 (Effects of Unrestricted Communication on Ethical Voting) Partisan vot-
ers will vote ethically more frequently when communication is unrestricted than when it is re-
stricted.
If our data corroborate these hypotheses concerning the effect of restricted and unrestricted
communication on voting behaviour, we still have to ask whether the deliberative process of
the two different chat conditions has made any impact or, alternatively, voting behaviour is
purely structure-induced. We can study effects of deliberation by comparing initial statements
about intentions with actual voting behaviour. Among the voter types differentiated above,
it is the swing voters (F and G) whose preference ranking deviates from their party because
they are assigned to their second preference and are thus induced a preference for strategic
voting behaviour. However, the communication context makes a difference for them. In the
restricted communication treatment, they are a minority within the party, and do not know
how the members of the other party will behave. In view of this uncertainty, they have an
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incentive to support their party from the outset in order to avoid the worst outcome, party C’s
victory. From the perspective of structure-induced behaviour (Shepsle, 1979), we should thus
observe that they indicate at the outset a plan to vote for their second preference. By contrast,
under unrestricted communication the other party’s tendency is revealed to them. They can
thus indicate a plan to vote for their first preference to help realize a majority for the other
party, which gives them the highest payoff. But if they observe a rally in favour of their own
party, they have an incentive to change their intention, also in order to avoid a victory of C.
We summarize this reasoning as follows:
Prediction 8 (First Intentions) We should find that more sincere voting intentions are stated
by swing voters assigned to their second preference in the All Chat treatment, who subsequently
shift to actually vote for their second preference if a majority for their first preference becomes
unlikely.
Prediction 9 (Structure-induced Preferences) In the restricted communication environ-
ment of the Party Chat condition swing voters assigned to their second preference change in-
tentions less often than in other conditions.
3 Design and Procedure
3.1 Sequences and Sessions
We used a within and between subjects design to evaluate these predictions. The voting task
was repeated for 19 periods. Specifically, we conducted four sequences. In sequence 1, subjects
first participated in 5 periods using the Baseline Treatment, 7 periods using the Party Label
Treatment, and then 7 periods using the Party Chat Treatment. In sequence 2, we replaced
the Party Chat Treatment with the All Chat Treatment. In sequence 3 subjects participated
in the Baseline Treatment for all 19 periods and in sequence 4 subjects participated in the
Baseline Treatment for the first 5 periods and the Party Label Treatment for the remaining 14
periods. We ran Sequence 3 and Sequence 4 in order to control for learning effects that might
confound our comparisons of the communication treatments with the other two treatments.
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The communication treatments came last because they involved the most complex interaction
situation which was difficult to explain to subjects without some prior experience with the
Baseline and Party Label Treatments.
Upfront, subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of three parts. However,
the instructions for each part were only distributed after the previous part had been completed.
We ran two sessions with 24 subjects, three sessions with 22 subjects and one with 20 subjects.9
Appendix C summarizes the sequences by session and the number of subjects.
In the Party and All Chat treatments the communication phase was limited to a maximum
duration of 10 minutes (which was hardly ever actually exhausted). Subjects were not allowed
to communicate any information that might identify them to other subjects in the experiment.
A subject could leave the chat before the communication time was over. The communication
stage was closed, once all participants had left the chat.
3.2 Laboratory Procedure
Our experiments were conducted at the MSW experimental laboratory of the Carl-von-Ossietzky
University in Oldenburg, Germany. Participants were undergraduate students recruited from
all departments of the university. The experiments were implemented computerised using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experimental code is available from the authors upon
request.
Upon arrival in the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to workstations separated
by blinds. The instructions for the first part of the treatment (The instructions used in sequence
1 can be found as an online appendix) were read aloud, and questions were answered privately
by the experimenters. A short comprehension test was run to make sure all participants had
understood the experiment. Of the total 19 periods in every sequence, 4 were randomly chosen
for payment, which was common knowledge. The experimental currency were “points” with
an exchange rate of 2.5 points per Euro or each point was worth 0.40 Euro. The experimental
sessions lasted on average two hours, average payoffs were 29.3 Euro. After the experiment the
participants filled in a short questionnaire, they were paid privately in cash and left the lab.
9Due to a computer network failure during the experiment, the data was improperly recorded for five periods
in session 3. We do not use the data for those periods. Our results are robust to excluding session 3 altogether.
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4 Results
We restrict the analysis to periods 13-19 in order to compare the same periods across treatments.
Periods 1-12 are here considered a learning phase. Given our procedure of several treatments per
session we could have run within-subjects tests as well. We decided to test between subjects
only to exclude interferences of learning and treatment effects, assuring the highest possible
comparability of the observations from all treatments.
The facts that very few voters choose C and that the likelihood of strategic voting is much
larger when M > 0 than when M = 0, as it should (see Appendix D, Table D1),10 suggest that
the induction of preferences was successful, payoff maximization by strategic voting holds and
voters recognized the benefit of strategic voting.11
Whilst the theoretical argument runs from individual behaviour to aggregate outcomes,
we organize the presentation of results in reverse order. In the first step, we discuss voting
outcomes. At the election level, we analyse the extent to which parties A and B are able to
defeat party C in the four treatments. At the individual level, we compare the voters’ payoffs in
the different treatments. In the second step we proceed to individual voting behaviour leading
to the outcomes. Finally, we explore the impacts of the treatments on the deliberative process
in more detail by analysing differences in stated voting intentions.
4.1 Voting Outcomes
We start with prediction 4. Do voters actually coordinate better when communication is unre-
stricted? In Table 2 we compare the outcomes of elections in the four treatments when M > 0.
We also compute the average probability that A or B wins by treatment, which is reported in
the last column.
Not surprisingly, we find an overwhelming majority of wins by C in the baseline and the
Party Label treatments. As with voting behaviour, we find no significant difference in the
probability that A or B wins between the two treatments (Z = 1.01, p = 0.31). The effect
10If the number of computer votes equals zero we expect no strategic voting by swing voters. Comparing all
sessions, the Party (All) Chat Treatment 28% (22%) of swing voters vote strategically when M > 0 and only 6%
(6%) do so when M = 0, t = -3.98 (-3.07), p = 0.00 (0.01).
11Because the number of subjects varied slightly by session, there were some minor differences across sessions
in the voter type distributions. We separated out the results for subjects in the sessions with 22 subjects as
the voter type distributions were identical in these sessions. The reported results for all sessions and those for
sessions with 22 subjects were qualitatively similar and differences were inconsequential.
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Table 2: Percentage Outcomes, M > 0
Treatment C Wins A or B tie with C A or B wins Obs. Avg. Prob. A or B wins
Baseline 100 0 0 17 0
Party Label 88.24 5.88 5.88 17 0.28
Party Chat 50.00 12.50 37.50 32 43.75
All Chat 20.59 11.76 67.65 34 73.53
of communication is impressive: The percentage of times Party C wins the election drops to
50% and 20.6%, for restricted and unrestricted communication, respectively. The Z statistic
comparing Baseline with Party Chat is 2.91, p = 0.00, and comparing Party Label with Party
Chat Z = 2.12, p = 0.03. The values for the same comparisons with All Chat are Z = 4.58,
p = 0.00, and Z = 4.34, p = 0.00, respectively. It is also clear that when communication is
unrestricted voters find it easier to coordinate and there is a much higher probability of a win
by either A or B and this difference is statistically significant (Z = 2.45, p = 0.01).
4.2 Payoffs
Do these larger numbers of wins by A and B have a significant positive effect on voters’ payoffs?
It might be the case that by voting more often, subjects actually see a reduction in payoffs given
they are paying higher costs of voting. Moreover, not all voters may be affected equally since
we observe that partisans’ and swing voters’ behaviours are different and that swing voters’
behaviours vary depending on the party to which they are assigned. In order to determine
the effects of restrictions on communication on voter payoffs, we calculated each subject’s net
expected payoff (NEP). NEP equals the subject’s expected gross payoff given the outcome of
the election (i.e. actual payoff when the election was not a tie, expected payoff when the election
was a tie) minus the realized voting cost.
Table 3 summarizes payoffs by voter type and treatment when M > 0. Two observations are
noteworthy: First, as expected the greater coordination capacity of voters in the two commu-
nication treatments results in generally higher payoffs. Compared to the baseline, swing voters
are able to double their earnings, while partisans’ earnings increase by about one third. Second,
there is a clear convergence in payoffs from the baseline and Party Label treatments to the two
communication treatments, with an additional effect of unrestricted communication.
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Table 3: Net Expected Payoffs, M > 0
Treatment Type Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Baseline Swing 48.97 11.98 9 55 96
Partisans 72.14 8.97 30 75 36
Party Label 1st Pref. 50.93 13.37 5 88 54
2nd Pref. 55.61 24.18 3 151 46
Partisans 73.55 18.40 23 155 44
Party Chat 1st Pref. 79.96 36.87 13 155 73
2nd Pref. 74.48 37.60 1 155 96
Partisans 85.94 35.72 25 155 63
All Chat 1st Pref. 93.46 34.10 11 155 94
2nd Pref. 99.37 33.35 16 155 102
Partisans 97.28 31.01 21 155 80
4.3 Voting Behaviour
The above two sections demonstrate that both election outcomes and individual payoffs vary
significantly across treatments. We now explore individual behaviour resulting in these out-
comes. Table 4 summarizes individual voting behaviour for periods 13-19 and constellations in
which the voters have to coordinate on some positive turnout in order to win against Party C
(M > 0). The table differentiates between swing voters and partisans, and between swing voters
attached to their first- and second-preferred party. Recall that, in principle, swing voters have
four strategies: abstaining, voting for their first preference, voting for their second preference,
and voting for party C, which is dominated by the other strategies. Partisans also have four
strategies, but for them, voting for both party C and the other party is dominated by voting
for their own party and abstaining. In the table, we therefore label voting for their own party
“sincere voting” and voting for the other party “ethical voting”.
Table 4: Voter Choices, M > 0
Swing Voters (F and G)
Treatment Party Label Abstain 1st Pref. 2nd Pref. Voted C Obs.
Baseline None 65.62 19.79 9.38 5.21 96
Party Label 1st Pref. 72.22 14.81 12.96 0 54
2nd Pref. 65.22 17.39 15.22 2.17 46
Party Chat 1st Pref. 34.25 41.10 24.66 0 73
2nd Pref. 41.67 26.04 31.25 1.04 96
All Chat 1st Pref. 34.04 41.49 24.47 0 94
2nd Pref. 29.41 50.00 20.59 0 102
Partisans (E and H)
Treatment Party Label Abstain Sincere Ethical Voted C Obs.
Baseline None 77.78 16.67 5.56 0 36
Party Label 1st Pref. 65.91 27.27 4.55 2.27 44
Party Chat 1st Pref. 50.79 42.86 6.35 0 63
All Chat 1st Pref. 37.50 53.75 8.75 0 80
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Contrary to the social psychological expectation of a labelling effect according to prediction
1, there is no significant difference in swing or partisan voting behaviour between the Baseline
Treatment and the Party Label Treatment (χ2 = 2.24, p = 0.52 for the comparison of partisans
and χ2 = 4.20, p = 0.24 for the comparison of swing voters). This also holds for the difference
between all swing voters in the Baseline Treatment and swing voters assigned to their first or
second preferred party in the Party Label Treatment (χ2 = 3.93, p = 0.27, and 1.71, p = 0.63,
respectively).
Prediction 2 refers to the effect of communication on turnout. We first compare the two
communication treatments to the two non-communication treatments. Communication has a
remarkable impact on the likelihood of participating in the election. While about two thirds
of the voters in the Baseline and Party Label treatments abstained, this share dropped to
about one third in the two communication treatments, except for partisans in the Party Chat
treatment, of whom 50% abstained. Comparing partisans to swing voters, we observe that
the former tend to abstain more often than swing voters within a communication treatment.
However, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. When we compare
swing voters and partisans in the two communication treatments with their behaviour in the
Baseline Treatment, we find significantly less abstention for both partisans and swing voters.12
We now turn to the comparison of restricted and unrestricted communication following
prediction 5. Table 4 suggests that the effect of restrictiveness in communication on turnout
is nuanced. Specifically, swing voters assigned to a party of their second preference are less
likely to abstain in the All Chat Treatment than in the Party Chat Treatment (χ2 = 3.25, p
= 0.07). This is not the case for swing voters attached to their first preferred party (χ2 =
0.001, p = 0.98), although, contrary to our prediction, the comparison between the two types of
swing voters within the Party Chat Treatment is not significant (χ2 = 0.96, p = 0.33). Turning
to partisans, we observe that they appear somewhat less likely to abstain in the unrestricted
communication treatment than in the restricted communication treatment. However, this effect
is not statistically significant at conventional levels (χ2 = 2.54, p = 0.11). Hence, the restriction
in communication is only behaviourally consequent for swing voters attached to their second
preferred party.
12Party Chat v. Baseline: χ2 = 6.99, p = 0.01, for partisans, and 18.09, p = 0.00, for swing voters. For All
Chat v. Baseline we have χ2 = 16.11, p = 0.00, and χ2 = 30.04, p = 0.00, respectively.
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Our second major topic is strategic voting. According to prediction 3 we should observe an
increase in strategic voting if communication is possible. Strategic voting is most likely observed
among swing voters assigned to their second preferred party. Indeed we find that, compared
to the assignment of party labels, the likelihood of voting strategically doubled by allowing for
communication within parties (from 15.22 percent to 31.25 percent). When we compare swing
voters in the two communication treatments with their behaviour in the Party Label Treatment,
we find significantly more strategic voting in both communication treatments (Party Chat v.
Party Label χ2 = 7.35, p = 0.01; All Chat v. Party Label χ2 = 3.00, p = 0.08). These results are
nuanced by a more detailed analysis of the behaviour of voters attached to their first and second
preferred party. When we compare the two different types of swing voters in the Party Label
Treatment with the same voters in the Party Chat treatment we find marginally significantly
more strategic voting when communication is allowed for those attached to their first-preferred
party (χ2 = 2.69, p = 0.10), and significantly more strategic voting for those attached to their
second preferred party (χ2 = 4.15, p = 0.04). For the comparison of these voter types between
the Party Label and the All Chat treatments, the effect is statistically significant for voters
assigned to their first-preferred party (χ2 = 2.81, p = 0.09), but not for those assigned to their
second preferred party (χ2 = 0.60, p = 0.44).
Focusing on the comparison of restricted and unrestricted communication following predic-
tion 6, Table 4 again suggests that the effect of restrictiveness in communication on strategic
voting only holds for swing voters attached to their second preferred party. More specifically,
swing voters assigned to a party of their second preference in the Party Chat treatment are
more likely to vote strategically (31.25 percent) than those of the same type in the All Chat
Treatment (20.59 percent) or those that are assigned to a party of their first preference in the
Party Chat Treatment (24.66 percent). However, the difference in behaviour between the two
communication treatments for those assigned to their second preference is only marginally sig-
nificant (χ2 = 2.94, p = 0.09), and the difference between voters attached to their first preferred
party and those attached to their second preferred party in the Party Chat treatment is not
statistically significant (χ2 = 0.89, p = 0.35). Thus, the differences support our Prediction 6
only for those voters that are attached to their second preferred party.
The results above do not control for differences in voting costs and for the fact that observa-
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tions are clustered by subjects. In order to determine if the differences in treatments are robust
to voting cost differences and subject identities, we estimated multinomial logit equations in all
treatments for periods 13-19, M > 0. Tables D2 and D3 in Appendix D present the analysis for
swing voters and partisans, respectively. Communication clearly leads to significantly higher
turnout and more strategic voting for swing voters and to significant increases in the partic-
ipation rate of partisan voters. We also find weak evidence that unrestricted communication
increases ethical voting of partisans (the effect is significant at the 7 percent level).13 There are
significant differences in behaviour of swing voters assigned to their second preferred party and
we control for differences in voting costs and subject identities. In particular, when communi-
cation is unrestricted, abstention is significantly lower and sincere voting is significantly higher
than when it is restricted, but there is no significant difference in strategic voting. Thus, our
ambivalent findings with respect to Prediction 6 are confirmed when we control for confound-
ing factors. Our results suggest that restricting communication lowers turnout of those voters
assigned to parties that are not their first preference. However, these voters are not voting
strategically more often than when communication is not restricted.14 From these results we
can conclude that communication prior to voting is indeed a crucial condition for overcoming
the voluntarist’s dilemma involved in multichoice elections with voting costs.
Finally, we turn to prediction 7 on ethical voting of partisans. Ethical voting—a vote cast
against the first preference, thereby incurring losses as compared to abstention—is a rather
marginal phenomenon (less that 10 percent) under the conditions of this experiment. Never-
theless, the share of ethical voting almost doubles from the Party Label treatment to the All
Chat treatment, but even this difference does not attain statistical significance (χ2 = 0.75, p =
0.39).15 16
13Table D4 in Appendix D presents a multinomial logit model of vote choice of swing voters by whether they
are assigned to a party of their first preference in the two treatments in the sessions with 22 subjects (thus the
only difference in treatments is restriction on communication), clustered by subject id.
14We also estimated a multinomial logit model (not reported) for partisans in sessions with 22 subjects that
controls for voting costs and subject identities and found no significant differences in behaviour that can be
explained by restrictions to communication. The results are available from the authors.
15A side result is that abstention is much higher if M = 0 (see Appendix D, Table D1). This is plausible given
that the strategic problem reduces to a choice between A and B and the known distribution of preferences will
induce those with a first preference for the smaller party to abstain and those with a first preference for the larger
party to take a free ride in order to save voting costs.
16As with the swing voters, we also estimated a multinomial logit model (not reported) for partisans in sessions
with 22 subjects that controls for voting costs and subject identities and found no significant differences in
behaviour that can be explained by restrictions to communication. The results are available from the authors.
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4.4 Voting Intentions
When allowing for free-form communication, the experimental design effectively implements a
deliberative phase in the decision process. We thus need to analyse whether subjects changed
their minds about their vote choices as a consequence of being exposed to deliberation. Voters’
choices may be the result either of an ex ante understanding of the situation or of persuasion
in the course of deliberation. We differentiate between these two possibilities by comparing
first statements in the communicative phase to final decisions.17 If first statements and final
decisions are identical, then we conclude that deliberation did not affect the vote choice. If
they differ, then something must have happened during the communication phase that made
the subject change her mind. This change can be studied by an in-depth analysis of the chat
protocols.
Our approach is related to the techniques for coding natural language in experimental chats
used by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Kimbrough et al. (2008) and Goeree and Yariv (2011).
We summarize the apparent meaning of statements and classify these into different categories.
In our analysis we focus on the first statements made by voters about their intentions in the
upcoming election (see Kalwitzki et al., 2012). That is, we code the first statement where a voter
said what he or she planned to do in the election. Subsequently, we compare these statements
to actual voting behaviour and study the distribution of subjects across the categories.
In the case of swing voters, the possibilities are that the voter planned to abstain, vote
sincerely, vote strategically, or did not communicate a first intention. In the case of partisans,
the possibilities are that the voter planned to abstain, vote sincerely, vote ethically for the
choice of A or B that was not their first preference, or did not communicate a first intention.
We did not observe either swing voters or partisans communicating a first intention to vote for
C. Of course, in some cases the statements made about first intentions have been influenced by
statements made by previous voters about what others should choose. When it is obvious that a
voter is stating that he or she plans to follow some previous suggestion of earlier communicators,
we classify that voter’s statement as providing no communication as to his or her first intention.
We examine two aspects of voters’ first intentions: First, we consider whether voters’ state-
17An alternative approach would be to ask for a private or public statement prior to the communication
phase as part of the experimental protocol. While this approach would result in a more valid categorization of
first statements, we are also interested in the question whether subjects make such statements or withhold this
information. By eliciting a statement, this question cannot be answered any more.
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ments of first intentions are affected by whether communication is restricted or not. Second,
we consider whether fulfilment of these first intentions—whether voters ended up making the
choices they stated—is affected by whether communication is restricted or not. Jointly, these
comparisons provide us with evidence about the influence of communication on voter behaviour
and whether that influence is affected by restrictions in communication.
Table 5: First Intentions, M > 0
Treatment Party Affiliation Stated first intention
Abstain 1st Pref. 2nd Pref. None Obs.
Party Chat Swing 1st Pref. 28.77 (66.67) 42.47 (77.42) 21.92 (56.25) 6.85 73
Swing 2nd Pref. 35.42 (70.59) 29.17 (64.29) 29.17 (78.57) 6.25 96
Partisans 28.57 (83.33) 52.38 (63.64) 0 19.05 63
All Chat Swing 1st Pref. 13.83 (61.54) 73.40 (46.38) 7.45 (57.14) 5.32 94
Swing 2nd Pref. 11.76 (41.67) 68.63 (62.86) 9.80 (60.00) 9.80 102
Partisans 11.25 (77.78) 83.75 (68.66) 0 5.00 80
Percentage who fulfilled stated first intentions is in parentheses
In Table 5 we present a summary of the results from our analysis of voters’ first intentions
and how these intentions matched voting behaviour in the cases where M > 0. The percentage
who fulfilled their first intentions of those having stated a particular intention are presented
in parentheses. The column marked “None” contains those subjects who either did not com-
municate or gave too vague information about their intention to code it. Note that we do not
observe any partisan voters expressing first intentions to vote ethically.
Most of the voters made a first statement indicating whether they intended to abstain, to
vote sincerely for the first preference, or strategically for the second preference. Nevertheless,
as shown in the column marked “None”, we find that partisans are about three times as likely
not to make such a statement than swing voters in the Party Chat condition, while in the All
Chat condition those swing voters who were assigned to their second preference were about
twice as likely to withhold such information than either swing voters assigned to their first
preference or partisans. Thus, in the Party Chat condition, partisans are more reluctant to
disclose their intentions while in the All Chat condition potential swing voters assigned to their
second preference are more cautious in their communication strategy.
In Table 6 we refine this picture by cross-tabulating stated first intentions of swing voters
(types F and G) by their assignment to their first or second preference and by the type of chat
treatment. We observe a major effect for the Chat condition indicating that a larger share of
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Table 6: First Intentions by Treatment and Assignment, M > 0
Assignment to Preference
First Second
Treatment All Chat Party Chat All Chat Party Chat
Intention Abstain or Strategic 13 21 12 34
Intention Sincere Vote 69 31 70 28
χ2 (p) 10.11 (0.00) 26.25 (0.00)
χ2 (p) 5.40 (0.00)
the voters in the restricted communication treatment (Party Chat) intend to abstain or vote
strategically while there is a clear preference for reporting sincere voting intentions in the All
Chat condition. The effect of the party assignment is somewhat less pronounced. It is largely
due to the higher incidence of intentions to abstain or vote strategically among swing voters
assigned to their second preference. These voters have a strong incentive to vote strategically
under restricted communication because they do not know what the other party will do, while
they have a clearer picture of the voting intentions in the other party (whose victory results in
a higher payoff for them) in the unrestricted communication condition.
Swing voters assigned to their first preferred party have no incentive to vote strategically.
However, we find the same pattern for them as well. They are more likely to state first intentions
of abstaining or voting strategically and less likely to state first intentions of voting sincerely
when communication is restricted than when it is unrestricted. All of these differences are
statistically significant.
Table 7: First Intentions and Vote Choice of Swing Voters, M > 0
Vote Choice
Assigned to First Preference
Party Chat All Chat
Intention Abstain Sincere Strategic Total Abstain Sincere Strategic Total
Abstain 14 4 3 21 8 4 1 13
Sincere 4 24 3 31 20 32 17 69
Strategic 5 2 9 16 1 2 4 7
Not Stated 2 0 3 5 3 1 1 5
Total 25 30 18 73 32 39 23 94
Mantel-Haenszel χ2 = 6.17, p = 0.01 (excl. Not Stated)
Assigned to Second Preference
Party Chat All Chat
Intention Abstain Sincere Strategic Total Abstain Sincere Strategic Total
Abstain 24 5 4 33 5 5 2 12
Sincere 8 18 2 28 17 44 9 70
Strategic 4 2 22 28 2 2 6 10
Not Stated 4 0 2 6 6 0 4 10
Total 40 25 30 95 30 51 21 102
Mantel-Haenszel χ2 = 12.36, p = 0.00 (excl. Not Stated)
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Table 7 presents in more detail changes between stated first intentions and actual voting
decisions of potential swing voters after deliberation.18 About two-thirds to three-quarters of
the swing voters who stated a first intention to abstain stuck to this intention except for those
assigned to their second preference in the All Chat treatment, of whom only half maintained
their initial intention. Those abandoning their intention to abstain in the Party Chat chose
sincere and strategic voting in roughly equal proportion, while those in the All Chat developed
a preference for sincere voting by odds of about 2-3 to 1 during the deliberation phase. Turning
to those intending to vote sincerely, we find no difference in the propensity to change initial
intentions between the Party Chat and the All Chat condition for those assigned to their second
preference (for both about 60 percent), while there is a clear effect for those assigned to their first
preference: Two-thirds maintained their initially stated preference in the Party Chat condition,
while less than 50 percent stuck to it in the All Chat condition. The share of those shifting to
strategic voting instead of abstaining is larger in the All Chat condition. Finally, 80 percent
those who initially stated an intention to vote strategically maintained their initial strategy if
they were assigned to their second preference in the Party Chat condition, while this share is
only just over 50% in all three other conditions. As the Mantel-Haenszel statistics show, these
behavioural differences between the Party Chat and the All Chat treatment are statistically
significant for both types of swing voters, but they are more pronounced in the case of voters
assigned to their second-preferred party.
4.5 Summary
Our results can be summarized as follows:
1. Communication raises turnout levels and increases the proportion of strategic voting. This
result confirms findings from previous research suggesting that communication undermines
structure-induced equilibria by providing a mechanism of coordination.
2. As a result of higher turnout and more strategic voting, the number of times either Party
A or Party B beats Party C and the average payoffs increase substantially.
3. Indications that the communication treatments (unrestricted and restricted to within-
party communication) have a noteworthy impact on the distribution of individual voting
18One subject who voted C after having stated a first intention to abstain has been excluded.
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behaviour are nuanced. Swing voters assigned to their second preferred party tend to
abstain more often and vote strategically more often than those assigned to their first
preferred party.
4. In the Party Chat condition, voters tend stick to first intentions more often than in the
All Chat condition. In particular, a larger share of voters stating an intention to vote
sincerely finally votes strategically in the All Chat condition.
5. Ethical voting is a rather marginal phenomenon among partisan voters and its occurrence
does not seem to be affected by the communication condition.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an analysis of multiparty elections with costly voting and pre-voting
communication. To our knowledge these are the first such experiments which combine all three
elements. Given the complexity of the model, there is currently no analytic solution from which
clear expectations can be derived. This complexity is mirrored in the observed voting behaviour:
If no communication among subjects is allowed, the majority abstains. This result is not
affected by assigning subjects to a party. We investigate the effect of communication on voting
by designing two conditions, a restricted format in which computerized chat communication
is possible only among members of a party, and an unrestricted format in which all subjects
participate in a joint chat facility. Once communication is allowed, whether restricted or not,
voters are much more likely to participate in elections in general and to engage in strategic
voting. There are little differences in the overall results of the two communication conditions.
In addition, in our experiments we are able to measure the effects of communication restric-
tions directly by analysing the transcripts of the communications. We find that swing voters’
choices appear to be influenced by communication, particularly in the unrestricted communi-
cation setting. In particular, we find evidence that a substantial number of swing voters who
initially intended to vote sincerely, have been influenced by unrestricted communication to vote
strategically. This is in contrast to the larger proportion of strategic intentions from the outset
in the restricted communication mode. This finding, however, is in line with the proposition
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that deliberation is geared toward a problem-solving mode. Swing voters do understand the
structure of their decision problem and anticipate the necessary choices, which results in a
greater likelihood to take an accommodating position at the outset of the deliberation process.
At the same time, the lower turnout can be explained by the greater uncertainty about the
choices of the other party’s members that triggers abstention.19
Communication thus strongly improves the ability of groups to overcome the incentives to
abstain involved in the voting decision. Although statements are non-verifiable, they appear
to help subjects assessing the probability of different outcomes and in particular to discard
unlikely ones. While the strategic incentive to defect—either because free-riding yields addi-
tional expected payoff if the preferred party wins or because abstaining yields a higher payoff
than voting—does not change, communication apparently allows subjects to build up sufficient
mutual trust to take the risk of casting a vote. Secondly, the importance of information about
intentions of the full electorate is revealed by the fact that the restricted communication treat-
ment resulted in higher abstention rates than the unrestricted communication condition. The
uncertainty about the other party’s members voting intentions increased the attractiveness of
abstention. And thirdly, the more competitive setting of the unrestricted communication en-
vironment induces agents to state their first preferences while the restricted communication
environment is conducive to more accommodating strategies such as stating the intention to
vote for the second preference.
In view of our initial discussion of individual voting decisions, we interpret these result as
evidence in favour of a dominating strategic calculus that is conditioned on the informational
environment. Cutting communication across parties removes an important piece of information
for assessing the likelihood of election outcomes. Although statements by other subjects are
non-verifiable, knowing about the direction a rally is taking is sufficient to update the indi-
vidual estimate of the odds of outcomes. Subjects enter a deliberative process with a clear
understanding of the strategic situation and act such that they maximize expected payoffs.
This interpretation is consistent with the high abstention rates in the no-communication
conditions, with lower abstention rates and higher strategic voting rates among agents assigned
to their second preferred party but not among agents assigned to their first preferred party,
19Note, however, the similarity in behaviour of those assigned to their first and second preferred party. This re-
mains puzzling. One possible explanation may be interference with subject identities and vote costs. Multinomial
logit models (not reported), however, suggest that the results robust against the inclusion of vote costs.
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and with the higher percentage of first statements indicating an intention to vote for the first-
preferred party in the unrestricted communication condition as compared to the restricted
communication condition. This does not mean that there is neither space for the cognitive
dimension of communication nor for the impact of deliberation on the outcome. Also there is
some space for ethical voting. But these are rather marginal effects. Instead, agents mainly seem
to make strategic use of the information obtained in the process of deliberation and take into
account the communication conditions. They assess the trustworthiness of each other’s stated
intentions and they vote strategically if that maximizes expected payoffs. How much more
detailed knowledge on cognition, deliberation, and ethical voting can add to the assessment of
voting in small, structured groups, is an issue for further exploration.
However, the observation that agents have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences
under certain preference constellations under incomplete information is sobering because it
implies that structural conditions may undermine the very foundation of the idea of democracy:
If voters misrepresent their preferences at the outset of a deliberation process because they
expect their preferences to be on loosing ground anyway, the amount of commonality and
agreement in a constituency may be systematically overestimated and the condition of “free
and open exchange of information and reasons sufficient to acquire an understanding of [...]
the opinion of others” (Bohman, 1996, 16), which is a necessary requirement of deliberative
democracy, is seriously violated.
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Appendix A: Voting Equilibria
We focus on quasi-symmetric equilibria where all voters of the same type vote with the same probability.
Define p∗ij as the equilibrium probability that a voter of type i votes for party j. We assume that voters
do not choose weakly dominated strategies, so p∗EB = p
∗
HA = 0 and p
∗
iC = 0, all i. When M = 0, if
voters participate they will vote sincerely, choosing whether to participate or not based on their realized
cost of voting, the distribution of voter preferences, and their expectations of other voters’ participation
choices. Given our assumptions three possible quasi-symmetric equilibria exist for the cases we examine
in the experiments when M > 0, one in which if voters participate, all voters vote sincerely, one in which
if voters participate, voters of types E, F, and H vote sincerely and voters of type G vote strategically,
and one in which if voters participate, voters of types E,G, and H vote sincerely and voters of type F
vote strategically. In each of these equilibria, voters choose whether or not to participate based on their
realized cost of voting and their expectations of others’ choices.
Define p∗ij as the equilibrium probability that a voter of type i votes for party j. We assume that
voters do not choose weakly dominated strategies, so p∗EB = p
∗
HA = 0 and p
∗
iC = 0, all i.
When M = 0 our experiments are comparable to Levine and Palfrey’s experiments since party C
receives zero votes in equilibrium with the exception that unlike Levine and Palfrey, voters’ benefits from
their preferred party winning vary depending on their voter type.20 When M = 0, a quasi-symmetric
equilibrium is given by a set of cutpoints for each voter type c∗i where the cutpoint represents the cost
at which a voter is indifferent between abstaining and voting for their first preference. Because M = 0,
then p∗FB = p
∗
GA = 0. In equilibrium, these cutpoints are given by the following equations:
c∗i =
(
155− 75
2
)
PIV AB∗i = 40PIV AB
∗
i , i = E,H (1)
c∗i =
(
155− 105
2
)
PIV AB∗i = 25PIV AB
∗
i , i = F,G (2)
where PIV AB∗i is the probability that a vote by a voter of type i will be pivotal in the contest between
parties A and B, that is, make or break a tie given the equilibrium voting strategies of other voters.
These probabilities depend on the probabilities of voting and the number of voters of each type as given
by standard binomial formulas. The equilibrium probability of each voter type participating is equal to
the probability that his or her voting cost is less than their voter type cutpoint. Thus, given that voting
costs are uniformly distributed, p∗iA =
c∗i
55
for i = E,F and p∗iB =
c∗i
55
for i = G,H. In this equilibrium
all voters either vote sincerely for their first preference or abstain, depending on their cost of voting.
20Levine and Palfrey also provide subjects with a bonus for abstaining rather than having them pay a cost of
participating.
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When M > 0, voters face a more complicated choice situation. There are four possible situations
where a voter’s choice may be pivotal–the election is a close race between A and B, the election is a
close race between A and C, the election is a close race between B and C, and the election is a a close
three-way race. By close race we mean either that the election is a tie and so the voter, by casting his or
her vote, can break the tie, or the election is one vote short of a tie and the voter, by casting his or her
vote, can force a tie. Following the notation used above for PIV AB∗i , PIV AC
∗
i is the probability that
a vote by a voter of type i will be pivotal in a close race between A and C given the equilibrium voting
strategies of other voters, and PIV BC∗i is the probability that a vote by a voter of type i will be pivotal
in a close race between parties B and C given the equilibrium voting strategies of other voters. For close
three-way races we define the following pivot probabilities: PIV ABCT ∗i is the probability that a vote
by a voter of type i will force a three-way tie and PIV ABCW ∗i is the probability that a vote by a voter
of type i will break a three-way tie.21
For voters of types E and H, the equilibrium voting cost cutpoints are determined as follows since
they either vote for their first preference or abstain:
c∗E =
(
155− 75
2
)
(PIV AB∗E + PIV AC
∗
E) (3)
+
(
2 (155)− 150
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗E +
(
2 (155)− 150
3
)
PIV ABCW ∗E (4)
= 40(PIV AB∗E + PIV AC
∗
E) + 80
(
PIV ABCT ∗E + 2PIV ABCW
∗
E
3
)
(5)
c∗H =
(
155− 75
2
)
(PIV AB∗H + PIV BC
∗
H) (6)
+
(
2 (155)− 150
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗H +
(
2 (155)− 150
3
)
PIV ABCW ∗H (7)
= 40 (PIV AB∗H + PIV BC
∗
H) + 80
(
PIV ABCT ∗H + 2PIV ABCW
∗
H
3
)
(8)
For voters of types F and G the equilibrium strategies are more complicated since these voters
choose whether to vote and, if they participate, whether to vote sincerely or strategically. Assuming that
these voters find it optimal to vote sincerely, then the equilibrium voting cost cutpoints can be similarly
determined as for voters of types E and H:
21We need to distinguish between these two situations in the case of three way ties because the difference in
utility varies depending on the situation. In contrast, in the situations in the case of two-way ties, the difference
in utility is the same whether a voter’s vote breaks a tie or makes a tie.
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c∗F (sincere) =
(
155− 105
2
)
PIV AB∗F +
(
155− 55
2
)
PIV AC∗F ) (9)
+
(
2 (155)− 105− 55
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗F +
(
2 (155)− 105− 55
3
)
PIV ABCW ∗F (10)
= 25PIV AB∗F + 50PIV AC
∗
F + 25PIV ABCT
∗
F + 50PIV ABCW
∗
F (11)
c∗G (sincere) =
(
155− 105
2
)
PIV AB∗G +
(
155− 55
2
)
PIV BC∗G (12)
+
(
2 (155)− 105− 55
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗G +
(
2 (155)− 105− 55
3
)
PIV ABCW ∗G (13)
= 25PIV AB∗G + 50PIV BC
∗
G + 25PIV ABCT
∗
G + 50PIV ABCW
∗
G (14)
If these voters find it optimal to vote strategically, then the equilibrium voting cost cutpoints are
determined as follows:
c∗F (strategic) =
(
105− 155
2
)
PIV AB∗F +
(
105− 55
2
)
PIV BC∗F ) (15)
+
(
2 (105)− 155− 55
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗F +
(
2 (105)− 155− 55
3
)
PIV ABCW ∗F(16)
= −25PIV AB∗F + 50PIV BC∗F (17)
c∗G (strategic) =
(
105− 155
2
)
PIV AB∗G +
(
105− 55
2
)
PIV AC∗G (18)
+
(
2 (105)− 155− 55
6
)
PIV ABCT ∗G +
(
2 (105)− 155− 55
6
)
PIV ABCW ∗G(19)
= −25PIV AB∗G + 50PIV AC∗G (20)
If they participate, voters of types F and G will choose as follows assuming that when indifferent,
voters vote sincerely (i = F,G):
If c∗i (sincere) ≥ c∗i (strategic) vote sincerely
If c∗i (sincere) < c
∗
i (strategic) vote strategically
(21)
Substituting in for these critical cost values we have that if they participate, type F voters vote
sincerely if the following is true and vote strategically otherwise:
50PIV AB∗F + 50PIV AC
∗
F + 25PIV ABCT
∗
F + 50PIV ABCW
∗
F ≥ 50PIV BC∗F (22)
And if they participate, type G voters vote sincerely if the following is true and vote strategically
otherwise:
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50PIV AB∗G + 50PIV BC
∗
G + 25PIV ABCT
∗
G + 50PIV ABCW
∗
G ≥ 50PIV AC∗G (23)
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Appendix B: Distributions of Voter Types in Sessions with 22
Subjects
Table B1: Distribution of Voter Types By Period in Sessions with 22 Subjects
NP = Control, P = Party Label, C = Communication
Party A Party B
Treatment-Period C Voters E Voters F Voters G Voters F Voters G Voters H Voters
NP-1, P-7 6 2 2 2 2 2 1
NP-2, P-11 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
NP-3, P-11 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
NP-3, P-8, C-13, C-18 4 1 0 2 2 1 0
NP-3, P-8, C-13, C-18 3 1 0 1 2 1 0
NP-4, P-12, C-16, C-19 7 1 2 2 2 2 2
NP-5 10 3 4 4 4 4 3
P-6 4 2 2 2 2 2 1
P-6 4 1 2 2 2 2 1
P-7, C-16, C-19 6 1 2 2 2 2 2
P-9 12 3 4 4 4 4 3
P-10 4 1 3 3 1 2 1
P-10 4 1 1 2 3 3 1
P-12 7 2 2 2 2 2 1
C-14 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
C-14 4 2 2 0 0 2 2
C-15 0 3 4 4 4 4 3
C-17 7 2 2 2 3 1 1
C-17 7 1 1 3 2 2 2
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Appendix C
Table C1: Sequence by Session
Periods
Sequence Session 1-5 6-12 13-19 Subjects
1 1 Baseline Label Party Chat 22
1 3 Baseline Label Party Chat 20
2 2 Baseline Label All Chat 22
2 4 Baseline Label All Chat 24
3 5 Baseline Baseline Baseline 22
4 6 Baseline Label Label 24
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Appendix D: Additional Tables
Table D1: Pct. Choices of Swing Voters in Communication Treatments
M = 0
Party Chat All 1st Pref. 62.50 25.00 12.50 0 16
All 2nd Pref. 68.75 31.25 0 0 16
22 subj. 1st Pref. 37.50 50.00 12.50 0 8
22 subj. 2nd Pref. 87.50 12.50 0 0 8
All Chat All 1st Pref. 68.75 25.00 6.25 0 16
All 2nd Pref. 75.00 18.75 6.25 0 16
22 subj. 1st Pref. 75.00 12.50 12.50 0 8
22 subj. 2nd Pref. 75.00 12.50 12.50 0 8
Table D2: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Swing Voters’ Choices
All Treatments with M > 0, Periods 13-19
Abstention in Baseline Treatment is Base Outcome, C Votes Omitted
Voters Assigned to 2nd Preferred Party Voters Assigned to 1st Preferred Party
Indep. Var. Coeff. R. Std. Err. z Pr > |z| Coeff. R. Std. Err. z Pr > |z|
Sincere Vote
Party Label -0.29 0.48 -0.60 0.55 -0.51 0.42 -1.23 0.22
Party Chat 1.01 0.42 2.42 0.02 1.28 0.36 3.52 0.00
All Chat 1.93 0.38 5.05 0.00 1.46 0.36 4.06 0.00
Vote Cost -0.06 0.01 -5.61 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -4.62 0.00
Constant 0.41 0.39 1.04 0.30 0.09 0.39 0.23 0.82
Strategic Vote
Party Label 0.32 0.60 0.53 0.60 0.08 0.68 0.11 0.91
Party Chat 2.00 0.57 3.48 0.00 1.49 0.59 2.52 0.01
All Chat 1.83 0.57 3.21 0.00 1.69 0.56 3.03 0.00
Vote Cost -0.07 0.01 -6.01 0.00 -0.06 0.01 -6.07 0.00
Constant -0.15 0.49 -0.30 0.77 -0.31 0.47 -0.66 0.51
Obs. = 333, Clusters = 126 Obs. = 312, Clusters =126
L. Like. = -292.09, P. R2 = 0.15 L. Like. = -273.87, P. R2 = 0.14
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Table D3: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Partisans’ Choices
All Treatments with M > 0, Periods 13-19
Abstention in Baseline Treatment is Base Outcome, C Votes Omitted
Sincere Vote
Party Label 0.78 0.65 1.19 0.23
Party Chat 1.42 0.58 2.45 0.01
All Chat 2.02 0.57 3.56 0.00
Vote Cost -0.04 0.01 -4.03 0.00
Constant -0.67 0.54 -1.23 0.22
Other or Ethical Vote
Party Label 0.28 1.23 0.23 0.82
Party Chat 0.67 0.85 0.80 0.43
All Chat 1.44 0.80 1.81 0.07
Vote Cost -0.08 0.02 -3.46 0.00
Constant -1.04 0.80 -1.31 0.19
Obs. = 222, Clusters =114 , L. Like. = -172.32, P. R2 = 0.12
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Table D4: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Swing Voters’ Choices
Chat Treatments with M > 0, Sessions with 22 Subjects
Abstention in Party Chat is Base Outcome, C Votes Omitted22
Voters Assigned to 2nd Preferred Party Voters Assigned to 1st Preferred Party
Indep. Var. Coeff. R. Std. Err. z Pr > |z| Coeff. R. Std. Err. z Pr > |z|
Sincere Vote
All Chat 1.14 0.55 2.07 0.04 0.21 0.57 0.37 0.71
Vote Cost -0.05 0.02 -3.37 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -1.59 0.11
Constant 0.90 0.67 1.34 0.18 0.63 0.54 1.17 0.24
Strategic Vote
All Chat 0.14 0.59 0.23 0.816 0.62 0.69 0.90 0.37
Vote Cost -0.07 0.02 -3.47 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -3.31 0.00
Constant 1.43 0.54 2.65 0.01 0.95 0.65 1.47 0.14
Obs. = 111, Clusters = 42 Obs. = 80, Clusters = 40
L. Like. = -102.98, P. R2 = 0.12 L. Like. = -81.29, P. R2 = 0.07
22Only one subject voted for C in one period. However, including this observation results in a failure of the
multinomial logit estimation.
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